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hand drawing books. The question arises as to which was the key crime: The 
ruled pages, the flaunting of authority, or the insistence upon adherence to 
questionable educational theory? 
In the final article of 28 (1) Janice Rahn describes three examples of 
collaborative art education that focuses on the use of multi-media. Local artists 
teamed up with classroom teachers and pre-service art specialists. Together 
with the children they developed the themes and produced artworks that 
ultimately involved the larger community beyond the classroom walls. 
Implications in regard to the potential for positive impact of popular culture on 
education are clearly delineated. 
Two book reviews round out this issue. Vladimir Spicanovic, reviews Howard 
Singerman's text, Art subjects: Making rrtists in the American university. 
Michael Emme, reviews James Laspina's, The visual turn and the 
transformation of the textbook. 
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Abstract 
Instrumentalism is a problematic ideology that has enthralled the modern 
consciousness for which we are paying the severe price of social and 
ecological disintegration. This paper identifies the hyperactivity of linguistic-
conceptual consciousness, that is, the discursive mind, as powering 
instrumentalism and accordingly looks to Zen and Art as practices that can 
counterbalance the discursive emphasis-. As a particular illustration of how 
this resistance may work, haiku is explored. 
Resume 
L'instrumentalisme est une ideologie problematique a captive Ia conscience 
moderne et pour laquelle nous payons le prix eleva de Ia desintegration 
sociale et ecologique. Cet article traite de l'hyperactivite de Ia conscience 
llnguistique-conceptuelle, c'est a dire de l'esprit discurtif, comme d'un 
lnstrumentalisme puisssant. Le texte principal de cet article se penche ensuite 
sur le zen et l'art comme des pratiques capables de faire contrepoids a 
!'Importance du discours. Pour illustrer Ia facon dont cette resistance peut 
s'operer, l'auteur examine Ia notion de haiku. 
How admirable he is who does not think "Life is ephemerar 
when he sees a nash of lightning 
Bssho (1643- 1694) 
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The Work Before Us 
Today, economism has become the transnational religion, and profit 
maximization, its global mantra. 1 Increasingly, we look upon everything merely 
as a means to human ends, in particular today, economic ends.2 Evermore, 
we are losing the sense of the intrinsic worth of beings and things in the 
world. With this loss comes the planetary degradation and global exploitation 
that mark the last century. Nothing is sacred, for everything is at our disposal, 
is disposable. Land, water, air, creatures, people, works of art - all beings 
and things have become, or can become, resources and commodities. We 
live in the Age of Instrumentalism. The Age of Great Dying is upon us.3 
How shall we once again cherish, hold sacred and dear, this earth and ali its 
dwellers? One thing is certain. We cannot love what is not dear to our eyes, 
to our senses. And the eye that has lost the power of reverence and respect, 
the power of intrinsic valuing, is unable to see things, even the most wondrous 
sights, as cherishable. The eye that is graced with such power sees even the 
most insignificant and poor as worthy, invaluable.4 How we came to lose this 
power, and how complete the loss has been, are questions that I must set 
aside for another occasion and focus this essay on something far more urgent 
-how we may recover this power in this age of rampant instrumentalism and 
consumerism. We are spell-bound by these forces. Hence the first task before 
us is to break the spell. But what irresistible force lies behind this spell? 
In this essay, I shall make the claim, in response to the last question I posed 
above, that the problematic force is originally none other than our own 
discursive mind, the mind that conceptualizes and intellectualizes. Rightly, 
this discursive mind distinguishes us humans from other animals. Also, rightly, 
this mind is the source of stupendous achievements. But the discursive mind, 
when overextended, as can happen all too easily, leads to the erosion of 
intrinsic valuing, the capacity to value the world in and for itself, and not as a 
means to human ends. If my claim holds, what this entails for education is 
that (a) one important task of education in our time is the cultivation of intrinsic 
perception and valuing; and (b) the first step in this task is to learn to check 
the hyperactivity of the discursive, that is, the linguistic-conceptual, mind. 
Zen end the Art of Intrinsic Perception 
The above, then, are the considerations that bring me to Zen and haiku. Zen 
II a dlaolpllne of disrupting the automaticity of the discursive mind, thereby 
affording ourselves the opportunity to recover the non-discursive mind, which 
II the home of intrinsic perception. The project here, however, Is not to be 
understood as a demolition of the discursive mind. That would be like killing 
the addict in order to rid him of his addiction. Rather, the goal is to free 
ourselves from the addiction to the discursive mind. The problem is not the 
dlecuralve mind per se but our addiction to it. When we are not compulsively 
driven by the discursive mind, we can even work with it so as to render it a 
vehicle that takes us to the realm of the non-discursive. This intriguing counter-
dynamic, characteristic of Zen and the Daoist thinking in general, is no better 
llluatrated than in the Zen poetry form, haiku. The poetry-making of haiku, 
which does involve our linguistic-conceptual facility, takes us to the edge of 
the discursive mind and, there, when we let go of it, plunges us into the depths 
of the non-discursive mind. Thus we come face-to-face with the suchness of 
the world. In the experience of suchness lies the perception of the intrinsic 
nature of the world. 
The lnstrinsic Contra the Instrumental 
3 
Instrumentalism privileges the instrumental perception and values it over and 
above its polar opposite, the intrinsic perception and valuing. As such, it 
denotes an imbalance in our perception of and relationship to the world. I am 
not suggesting that we forgo our instrumental relationship with the world. 
That is simply impossible. In this material universe of interdependent mode 
of existence, things and beings exist foreach other; in order to exist at all, we 
have to take and use each other, as nourishment, tools, and resources. But 
this fundamental and unavoidable fact of life becomes morally problematic 
when it becomes dissociated from and dominates over another equally 
fundamental fact -that beings exist for and in themselves. In this in-itself, 
that is, intrinsic, dimension of Being, beings of this world have their own unique 
and individual life or existence, notwithstanding their fundamental 
Interdependence on each other. No matter how interconnected we all are, 
eaoh of us, humans and non-humans, is a singular individual entity whose 
exletence cannot be replaced or repeated by another. Each being dwells in 
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this world and enacts its own unique existential history. It is in this sense that 
we can speak of the existents as being subjects unto themselves. They are 
not just objects for others, 5 in particular, human others. The recognition of 
this subjectness of beings, not just of oneself but of others equally, constitutes 
our sense of intrinsic valuing.6 
The above is a logical account of the nature of intrinsic valuing. But what is it 
to experience other beings as subjects? Is that possible at all? What is it to 
see them intrinsically? Here we are seeking a phenomenological account 
One thing is clear. Intrinsic perception cannot be about the impossible quest 
of experiencing other beings in the way they experience themselves. I wouldn't 
know how a bamboo feels to itself. But I know how bamboo appears to me 
when I can pay a more sustained and undivided attention to it than what is 
usually required to simply recognize that it is bamboo (We call it "pattern-
recognition".) or when I look at it with an instrumentalist intention such as 
thinking of cutting it down to make my fence. When I can just regard it with no 
other purpose than receiving and absorbing, and being absorbed in its 
sensuous qualities as revealed to me; that is, when I can sensuously dwell in 
the way it appears to me, I am simply interested in the bamboo itself, not its 
uses or meanings to me. I think this is the most defensible understanding we 
have of what it is to experience others as intrinsic beings: that is, not just 
thinkthat they are. Carter (1990, p. 27) entertains a similar view, with an 
added reference to the notion of enjoyment or appreciation: 
To contemplate the world through our senses is to enjoy 
the world of sensation for its own sake, as a source of 
intrinsic-value experiences and not merely instrumentally 
because of the practical additional results it may afford ... 
[O]ne who can listen for the sake of listening, who takes joy 
in the sound of cicada or the crow, in the feeling of wet 
moss underfoot, in the warmth of rock in sun on a cold wintry 
day, and in the whiteness of the first spring flower, is not 
only likely to find the world valuationally richer; s/he will 
also find it more meaningful.7 
Zen and the Art of Intrinsic Perception 
The Intrinsic valuation that Carter describes above seems to be a surprisingly 
difficult feat for us. It is not that we are incapable of intrinsic perception. Insofar 
a1 we can sensuously dwell in and be absorbed in what meets our senses, 
we are capable of intrinsic perception. Yet when we are, as usual, dominated 
by our egocentric and instrumental interests, even such interest as wishing to 
extract the most enjoyment out of our experience, our awareness of other 
beings shrinks to one track - what values they have for us. We have then 
lost sight of the intrinsic dimension and worth of other beings and operate 
mo1tly In the Instrumentalist dimension. When afflicted with instrumentalism, 
all being• appear to us as only existing for us. They become our objects and 
lolt their subjectness. Looking at a primary growth forest, instrumentalists 
don't see these magnificent, venerable living trees, but only so many square 
feet of premium lumber that will fetch a handsome profit. Instrumentalism is 
thus a particular value system that selects, shapes, and guides our perception 
of the world. To be an instrumentalist is to have learnt to see beings merely 
as objects, never as subjects onto themselves. 
5 
This learning comes especially easy when the material world that surrounds 
us Is full of artifacts we have created. We think that what we create ourselves 
are our possessions, and thus we can do whatever we want with them, 
Including destroying them. What this means is that the value of things is not 
Inherent in them but is contingent upon our desire. Our desire, in turn, is 
subject to the advertising pressure by transnational corporations whose only 
goal is profit-making. 8 If something is seen as not conducive to profit-making, 
no matter how well-regarded it was before, its value drops down to nothing. 
Conversely, a thing's value can be made to rise by manipulating the consumers' 
desire for it. In other words, things have no value apart from someone's desire 
for It, and the desire can be manipulated and exploited. 
How shall we counter instrumentalism? I have argued that it is not our 
Instrumental relationship per se that is problematic but the hegemony, or shall 
we say, a Ia Foucault, the regime, of the instrumental relation. Hence, the 
btst strategy is to disrupt and correct the imbalance by promoting intrinsic 
perception and valuation, while simultaneously, curbing the instrumentalist 
mode of operation. The strategy I am suggesting here coheres well with 
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Borgmann's (1992) observation: "In a finite world, devotion to one thing will 
curb indulgence in another'' (p. 116). This is a well-recognized and regarded 
strategy, indeed. For instance, we keep ourselves healthy from infections, 
not so much by killing off germs, but by maintaining the body's strong immune 
system which will then protect the body from succumbing to the invasion of 
pathogenic germs. Likewise, grounding ourselves in intrinsic perception and 
valuation will provide enough checks and balance, immunity and resilience, 
to our instrumental relationship with the world so as to prevent the latter from 
enthralling us. Or, to go for a little more proactive strategy, when intrinsic 
valuation takes the priority over the instrumental valuation so that the former 
is the basic framework within which the latter must operate, instrumental 
valuation will have to be kept in check and handled with due caution and 
care. In other words, our instrumental needs will have to be balanced against 
the requirements of the intrinsic valuing. Thus, although we will have to 
continue to appropriate other beings to sustain our own lives, we would do so 
within the bounds of, or at least in recognition of and respect for, their intrinsic 
worth. I again refer to Synder's notion of sacramental economy. Certainly, 
this is a difficult demand, and we may fail more often than succeed in fulfilling 
it. But the commitment to such demand is what a moral life is about. 
There are many challenging ethical questions that arise from the notion of 
practicing the instrumental ways within the bounds of the intrinsic ways.9 But 
since the focus of this essay is on the cultivation of intrinsic perception, I must 
defer these ethical discussions to another space. 
Approaches to Intrinsic Valuation 
In promoting recognition of the intrinsic worth of all beings, we can approach 
this from the deontological perspective of abiding by the edict of treating other 
beings as having intrinsic worth; or we can approach it more experientially 
whereby we learn to actually perceive the intrinsic worth of others. Let us call 
this latter the perceptual approach. For the deontological approach, we have 
the famous maxim of Kant to never treat others merely as means but also as 
ends in themselves.1 0 The weight of moral injunction is supposed to be such 
that, even If we don't actually perceive others as having intrinsic worth, we 
are morally required to treat others as having, or perhaps more precisely, as 
Zen end the Art ollntrtnslc Perception 7 
If they have, Intrinsic worth. Now, a major attraction of the deontological 
approach Is the efficiency of its implementation. We do not have to wait around 
for people entrenched in instrumentalism to finally come around to perceive 
the Intrinsic worth of all beings before we can request that they treat others 
with Intrinsic respect. We will tell our children something like this: "I know you 
I 
are too young to appreciate this or know this intrinsic valuing business but 
IInce it is supremely important, please just do it. Do not treat others merely 
a1 means to your ends." Or to instrumentally oriented adults around us, we 
might say: "You ought to know better than treating others merely as means to 
your egotistic gain. But since it is obvious that you don't know, we just have to 
lnlllt that you treat others with respect, regardless of your current prejudiced 
perceptions and feelings." 
The deontological approach is immensely useful, for sure. Consider the traffic 
law. We do not ask people whether they feel like obeying the law or whether 
they have this intrinsic valuation of the law. By imposing and enforcing it on 
people, we can achieve effectively and efficiently the desired social end of 
coordinating the communal life. Nevertheless, the deontological approach 
hal a .substantive limit. Because it does not address the moral agent's 
perception and emotion, this approach does not get to the "heart" of the moral 
matter, to intend a double pun. Why is this? At the risk of oversimplifying 
human psych~logy, I posit that action tends to follow naturally from perception 
(llum, 1994; Vetlesen, 1994). We enact our perception. If we actually perceive 
tht Intrinsic worth in other beings, then natural/ywe will act in ways that are 
ooneletent with this perception. Conversely, if we don't see the intrinsic worth 
but only the Instrumental value in other beings, we will tend to act instrumentally 
toward• them. We can pretend to act as if others are intrinsically worthy; or 
wt may give a show of respect that is only skin-deep and wears off when 
IOratohed hard; or, under the enforcement of the rule, we are compelled to 
lot In oertaln ways but without the inner accordance. In all these ways, our 
lotion would not be a full enaction of the genuine perception of the intrinsic 
worth, When eubjected to the abrasive test of incommensurable, conflictual 
wertclvtiWI, valuea, and competing collective and personal interests, respect 
IMtll tnly lkln·dtep easily breaks down and cannot do the heavy-duty job 
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we expect of it. We expect a civil society, one that values its members, humans 
and non-humans, intrinsically. This is the situation that accurately describes 
our present world of plurality and disparity. 11 
Here, I do not wish to give the impression of setting up an either-or dualism 
between the deontological approach and the perceptual approach, and 
moreover, denouncing the former while supporting the latter. In general, 
dualistic thinking is a limited form of thinking; and we shouldn't fall for it. It is 
best to create some sort of synergistic relationship between polar opposites 
that we encounter. How shall we integrate or align the deontological with the 
perceptual approach? Roughly speaking, deontology sets out whatwe need 
to do and should not do (the normative), while the perceptual practice disposes 
us to do it (the experiential). Hence, the deontological approach can be 
employed as a heuristic or navigational measure to help people to enter and 
orient towards a target practice. To use an analogy, deontology can act as a 
trellis to support and guide a young plant, while perceptual practice is like the 
plant's own process of growing which, though impelled by the "inner growth 
plan," is materially and contingently supported by sunlight, water, minerals, 
and so on. Notice how, inasmuch as we say "we grow a plant," growing is not 
something we do but something that the plant does if given supportive 
conditions for flourishing. A plant would grow and grow well if given the right 
conditions. Likewise for intrinsic perception and valuation insofar as these 
are native to human consciousness, which they are. We would naturally 
perceive the intrinsic worth of all beings, if we are not so addicted to the 
instrumentalist perception. Thus, in thinking of undertaking the practice of 
intrinsic perception and valuation, that is, learning to actually perceive the 
intrinsic worth of all beings, a most reasonable strategy would be to inquire 
into the source of addiction that enthralls us to instrumentalism and to work 
with the source so as to liberate ourselves from its hold. What is the source of 
our addiction to instrumentalism? 
Working with Discursivity 
Instrumentalist perception is about seeing what use we can make of things. 
The uses can be anything from the next meal preparation to a quest for 
knowledge. A botanist, chancing upon a rare herb, might wish to pluck it for 
ltn tnd lhl Art of Intrinsic Perception 
htr examination and analysis. Whether her motivation is to advance knowledge 
or to achieve fame and wealth, she is motivated by a desire other than just 
appreciating the plant. A gourmet chef may want to use it for his prize dish. 
Ht might be aiming at delighting his gourmet friends, or at winning another 
cooking competition. An avid gardener, instantly envisioning how the plant 
will complement her exotic perennial garden, might carefully dig it out for 
transplanting. All of these folks are acting from their instrumentalist perception. 
Note how each of them sees the plant as something, as a specimen for 
analysis, a gourmet ingredient, a companion plant, a promise of wealth and 
fame, and so on. A thing is seen as something more or other than what simply 
meets the senses. Wittgenstein (1976) called this kind of seeing-as"aspect-
seeing". 
A cardinal point about aspect-seeing, for our analysis, is that it is predicated 
upon, or mediated by, conceptualization, in particular, language. That is, we 
need concepts, often articulated in words, to do this aspect-seeing. For 
example, suppose one were to see gigantic yellow cedar trees in a forest. 
Getting from the sensuous seeing of the tree to the notion, "There is a lot of 
expensive lumber in this forest. Each tree will bring in about two thousand 
dollars". The judgements require a series of concepts. While these concepts 
are "running through one's head," even though one may be looking at the 
tree, one is not seeing the tree just for what it is but what it can be, in this 
case, expensive lumber. For another person with a different interest, the tree 
could be seen as something other than lumber, say, a place to put up a tree 
house. And so on. What this explication leads us to is an understanding that 
the instrumentalist perception of seeing something as a means to our ends 
depends on our seeing a being or thing as this or that possibility, rather than 
just for what it is. To put it another way, without this ability of aspect-seeing 
enabled by conceptualization, there would be no instrumentalist perception. 
Sensuous perception by itself, that is, conceptually unmediated perception, 
cannot give rise to the instrumentalist perception. 12 (For the sake of 
convenience, I would like to use at this point the term "discursivity" to refer to 
the mind that conceptualizes and can articulate in language.) 
·~ 
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Given the above reasoning, that instrumental perception is powered by the 
discursive mind, what we have to do to liberate ourselves from the enthrallment 
of instrumental perception and valuation is to liberate ourselves from the 
discursive mind. As long as we are not engaged with the discursive mind, we 
are safe from instrumentalism. At least such seems to be the impeccable 
logic. But we have to be careful here with our understanding. If liberation 
from discursivity is understood as not participating at all in discursivity, we 
are seeking a way that lies almost beyond being human. Let those who seek 
this way pursue their goal. But those of us who choose to continue to 
conceptualize and use language have to find a way that does not eschew 
discursivity. Is it possible to remain human and engage in discursivity while 
not succumbing to instrumentalism? Certainly. An analogy may be helpful 
here. Just because I know karate, does not mean that I will use it to harm 
someone. Ability does not imply activity, although an activity would presuppose 
an ability. I may have a discursive mind, but I need not be engaged with it 
exclusively or excessively. I have other kinds of mind, too, and I may learn to 
dwell in them more often. 
As we noted earlier, instrumentalism is not so much about the fact of our 
having instrumental perception and valuation but about their excessiveness. 
As long as our instrumental valuation does not dominate us and leaves plenty 
of room for intrinsic perception and valuation, we will be protected from 
exclusive acts of instrumentalism. Thus, although we have located the source 
of instrumental perception in the very fact of our discursivity, the crucial issue 
for us seeking ways to counter instrumentalism is the balance between the 
intrinsic and the instrumental. In light of this clarification, then the key question 
of strategy for resisting instrumentalism becomes, "How do we restore the 
balance between discursivity and non-discursivity?". Since we have an 
imbalance in favour of discursivity, we need to simultaneously curb the 
hyperactivity of discursivity and foster non-discursivity. This is where the 
Buddhist understanding and practice of non-duality and non-discursivity can 
be helpful. 13 At the core of the Buddhist practice is what we may call, a Ia 
Foucault, the technology of consciousness which effects recovering of the 
non-discursive, that is, non-conceptual and non-linguistic, mind concealed 
by all the buzz and commotion of the hyperactive discursivity. 
~· 
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Thl dlecurslve mind has to come to rest, thereby giving way to the wordless 
tlltnoe of Being, for there to arise the perception in the intrinsic mode of 
ltlng. This is how Nargarjuna, the peerless Buddhist dialectician of the fifth 
century, talks about the resting of the discursive mind: "Ultimate serenity is 
the coming to rest of all ways of taking things, the repose of named things."14 
When conceptualization ceases and aspect-seeing subsides ("repose of 
named things"), and so does aspect-seeing (''taking things"), we come face-
to-face with the world in its intrinsic mode of being ("ultimate serenity"). Now, 
zooming rapidly through the space-time continuum, we have Schopenhauer 
(1983) in the 19th Century West who expresses the same idea as Nargajuna 
but In greater discursive detail. For the benefit of thorough explanation, I shall 
quote the lengthy passage: 
If, raised by the power of the mind, a man relinquishes the 
common way of looking at things, gives up tracing, under 
the guidance of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, 
their relations to his own will; if he thus ceases to consider 
the where, then when, the why, and the whither of things, 
and looks simply and solely at the what; if, further, he does 
not allow abstract thought, the concepts of the reason, to 
take possession of his consciousness, but, instead of all 
this, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks 
himself entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness 
be filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object 
actually present, whether a landscape, a tree, a mountain, 
a building, or whatever it may be; inasmuch as he loses 
himself in this object...,i.e., forgets even his individuality, 
his will, and only continues to exist as the pure subject, the 
clear mirror of the object, so that it is as if the object alone 
were there, without any one to perceive it, and he can no 
longer separate the perceiver from the perception, but both 
have become one, because the whole consciousness is 
filled and occupied with one single sensuous picture ... (p. 
231) 
11 
I 
!II 
il 
I 
,, 
11!11/i 
1
1
1i\ 
,11!111 
)I] 
Iilii 
12 Heesoon Bai 
Zen Aesthetics 
Among all the traditions of Buddhism, of which there are a great variety, 
perhaps Zen is most felicitous for the cultivation of the non-discursive and 
non-dual. This is because Zen did not remain just a religious-spiritual tradition 
but pervaded the arts and crafts, indeed all aspects of everyday life, and 
rendered them vital expressions and ways of Buddhist spiritual experience, 
namely nonduality and non-discursivity (Suzuki, 1959). All manners of art 
and craft, from flower arrangement (ikkebana)to swordmanship (kendd), from 
Haiku to tea ceremony (chanoyt.J), became the ways (tad) of Zen. Although 
sitting meditation (zazeriJ remained the standard practice, the royal road, in 
"pursuit" of Enlightenment, 15 these Zen arts and crafts vastly broadened the 
possibilities of Zen practice, in effect bringing Zen out from the hermitages 
and temples to the streets of ordinary folk. Everyone can practice Zen, for the 
Zen tradition offers manifold arts, crafts, and rituals as different paths to the 
same goal of attaining the intrinsic perception of the world. Moreover, there is 
no reason written into the essential understanding of Zen why non-traditional 
or non-Japanese arts and crafts cannot be equally effective practices of Zen. 
The essence of Zen (and Buddhism in general), which is enligtenment (satorl}, 
is transcultural, and for this reason, the expressions of Zen can assume any 
cultural modes.16 What is satorP. Briefly stated, satonis discovering the intrinsic 
meaning in all that we experience. In the words of Daisetz T. Suzuki (1959): 
"The meaning thus revealed is not something added from the outside. It is in 
being itself, in becoming itself, in living itself. [The meaning consists of] the 
'isness' of a thing, Reality in its isness."(p. 16). Suzuki goes on to elucidate 
the vital connection between Zen and artistic perception: 
When the mind, now abiding in its isness ... and thus free 
from intellectual complexities and moralistic attachments 
of every description, surveys the world of the senses in all 
its multiplicities, it discovers in it all sorts of values hitherto 
hidden from sight. Here opens to the artist a world full of 
wonders and miracles.(p. 17) 
.; 
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Although thla passage may give the impression that through first discovering 
lfttrlniiO perception and valuation we are then able to access the world of 
artlltlo perception and creation, the converse is equally valid. And it is this 
IOnVtrlt that particularly interests me in my project of resisting instrumentalism 
and promoting intrinsic perception and value. Through engaging in artistic 
perception and creation, we can access the intrinsic. 
Now, In talking about the intersection between artistic perception and intrinsic 
valuation, I do not mean to define what art is, as if it is one thing. Art, like life 
ltltlt, Is diverse enough to encompass a wide range of purposes and 
meanings, methods and expressions, and complex enough to resist defining. 
lnetrumentalism, too, is not foreign to art. However, I believe that intrinsic 
perception is particularly evident in artistic engagement. Even though the 
final product of the engagement is for an instrumental purpose, the process 
Itself calls for a sustained intrinsic attitude, perception, and action. It is on this 
aspect of art that Zen aesthetics focuses. Soetsu Yanagi (1972), whose Zen-
Infused understanding of arts and crafts is revered, has outlined three pieces 
of priceless advice to anyone who wishes to cultivate artistic perception: 
First, put aside the desire to judge immediately; acquire 
the habit of just looking. Second, do not treat the object as 
an object for the intellect. Third, just be ready to receive, 
passively, without interposing yourself. It you can void your 
mind of all intellectualization, like a clear mirror that simply 
reflects, all the better. This nonconceptualization -the Zen 
state of mushin ("no mind") - may seem to represent a 
negative attitude, but from it springs the true ability to contact 
things directly and positively. (p. 112) 
In the following section, I shall explore a particular Zen art, haiku poetry, to 
Illustrate how an art form can achieve nonconceptualization. Haiku is an 
example extraordinaire because it demonstrates that overcoming hyper-
dlscursivity is not a matter of somehow or another disabling or eliminating our 
discursive mind but, rather, working with it skillfully. The former effort is doomed 
to fall, anyway. Discursivity is a pervasive condition of our being. Whatever 
non·dlscursivity we have to attain has to emerge from skillfully working with 
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our discursivity. It is for this reason that I am interested in exploring Haiku, 
the well-known Japanese poetic form which uses 17 syllables in 3 lines. 
Through this illustration, I hope to demonstrate my thesis that the fact of our 
having to use words does not necessarily compromise our attaining wordless 
silence and that a discursive activity like poetry-making can be a way to 
experiencing the world non-discursively and intrinsically. Indeed, in haiku, we 
see a perfect example of non-duality, an overcoming of the apparent duality, 
between language and silence. 
Haiku 
Haiku became a Zen art in the hands of Matuso Basho (1643- 1694), Japan's 
most celebrated haiku poet to this day. Before Basho, haiku was "mere plays 
on words with nothing deeper than pleasantries" (Suzuki, 1959, p. 239). But 
Basho revolutionized haiku, launching the beginnings of modern haiku. With 
him haiku became a tool of intrinsic perception. Here is a well-known 
(immortalized, I should say) haiku by Basho 
Furuikeya The old pond 
Kawazu tobikomu A frog leaps in 
Mizuno oto And a splash 
This seems like a deceptively simple, child-like (or some would even say, a 
childish) poem. It seems to present no literary challenge: there is nothing 
complex, no suspicion of hidden, layered, "laminated" meanings, so typical of 
most poems- so much so that it seems to require no interpretation. What a 
welcome change such simple poetry is in an English literature course! Even 
the least poetic students are confident that they can turn out a few haiku 
poems. This appearance of utter brevity and simplicity, however, has provoked 
a profound misunderstanding that haiku is an easy and simple poetry. But, 
emphatically, haiku is not an intellectually unsophisticated, simplistic poetry. 
What we have here is something far more strange and radical - an "end of 
language," as Barthes (1982) puts it so pithily. The "frog in the pond" haikuis 
said to mark Basho's enlightenment, his attainment of intrinsic perception. 
Enlightenment, as it is understood in Zen or Buddhism in general, consists 
• lltl 111111 1t11 Art ollnlrlnelc Perception 
lf1 ,_,lily, the break-through from the linguistic-conceptual mind that stands 
M Itt way of directly, intuitively, hence intrinsically apprehending the reality. 
lifthll' (1992) commentary is incomparable: 
When we are told that it was the noise of the frog which 
awakened Basho to the truth of Zen, we can understand 
(though this is still too Western a way of speaking) that 
Basho discovered in this noise, not of course the motif of 
an 'illumination,' of a symbolic hyperesthesia, but rather an 
end of language: there is a moment when language ceases 
(a moment obtained by dint of many exercises), and it is 
this echoless breach which institutes at once the truth of 
Zen and the form -brief and empty - of the haiku. (p. 
74)(emphasis added) 
15 
Let us take a closer look at Basho's "frog in the pond" haiku. Conspicuously 
absent are descriptives; there are no adjectives, adverbs to describe the 
named things and actions. What does this absence mean? Here is Barthes 
(Ibid.) again: 
Description, a Western genre, has its spiritual equivalent in contemplation, 
the methodical inventory of the attributive forms of the divinity or of the episodes 
of evangelical narrative ... the haiku, on the contrary, articulated around a 
metaphysics without subject and without god, corresponds to the Buddhist 
Mu, to the Zen satori, which is not at all the illuminative descent of God, but 
"swakening to the fact," apprehension of the thing as event and not as 
substance ... (emphasis added) (p. 78). 
Descriptions mediate reality. We see reality through descriptions. Thus, 
descriptions stand in the way of our immediate, that is, unmediated, perception 
of what is. Now, I am aware that the notion of unmediated perception has 
been vigorously disputed in western epistemology. We have been told time 
and again that all perceptions are conceptually, therefore, linguistically, 
mediated. 17 However, Buddhist epistemology disputes this claim on an 
empirical ground. With an adequate ''training" of the attention, it is possible to 
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experience ''thought-less" perception (Brown and Engler, 1986). For instance, 
one is able to catch the "naked," unmediated, nondiscursive, perception prior 
to its conceptual dressing-up. 
Assuredly, the attentional training is difficult to undertake. Our mind has the 
tendency to wander off into discursive thinking, performing continually the 
linguistic-conceptual feat of seeing things as this or that. This, as we discussed 
earlier, is Wittgensteinian aspect-seeing. It is not an overstatement that we 
almost never see things simply as themselves. So heavily mediated by 
conceptualization, therefore discursive, is our consciousness that we hardly 
ever notice things and beings for what they are apart from what they mean to 
us. Haiku is one form of consciousness training to decondition the discursive 
mind, special in that it involves directly working with language. To express it a 
little ironically, haiku is a language that puts a break on our languagedness. 
How does that work? Stryk's (1977) following comments reveal his incisive 
understanding of Zen and haiku. 
The Zen experience is centripetal, the artist's contemplation 
of subject sometimes referred to as 'mind-pointing'. The 
disciple in an early stage of discipline is asked to point the 
mind at (meditate upon) an object, say a bowl of water. At 
first he is quite naturally inclined to metaphorize, expand, 
rise imaginatively from water to lake, sea, clouds, rain. 
Natural perhaps, but just the kind of 'mentalization' Zen 
masters caution against. The disciple is instructed to 
continue until it is possible to remain strictly with the object, 
penetrating more deeply, no longer looking at it but, as the 
Sixth Patriarch Hui-neng maintained essential, as it. Only 
then will he attain the stage of muga, so close an 
identification with object that the unstable mentalizing self 
disappears. (p. 23) 
The brevity of haiku(only seventeen Japanese syllables) forces the discursive 
mind to reverse its expansive flow of energy and purpose and become 
concentrated, focused. What is aimed at is the intensification of 
consciousness.18 The consciousness must become so focused and intense 
.,,,, 
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thlt thtre Is no room left for subjunctivity of language, no seeing-as. Thus the 
Mind, that great organ of narratives and metaphorical thinking, becomes silent. 
... ho himself has commented on the requirement of the silent mind: "How 
Mmlrable he is who does not think 'Life is ephemeral' when he sees a flash 
of lightning!" Only in utter silence of the mind, the mind that has stopped 
moving In the discursive space, one "awakens to the fact" (Barthes, p. 72) 
Thll Is enlightenment in the Eastern sense. Barthes's (ibid.) comments are, 
again, Incomparable. I have not encountered a more incisive understanding 
of Zen. I shall quote the passage at length: 
All of Zen, of which the haiku is merely the literary branch, 
thus appears as an enormous praxis destined to halt 
language, to jam that kind of internal radiophony continually 
sending in us, even in our sleep ... to empty out, to stupefy, 
to dry up the soul's incoercible babble; and perhaps what 
Zen calls satori, which Westerners can translate only by 
certain vaguely Christian words (illumination, revelation, 
intuition), is no more than a panic suspension of language, 
the blank which erases in us the reign of the Codes, the 
breach of that internal recitation which constitutes our 
person; and this state of a-language is a liberation, it is 
because, for the Buddhist experiment, the proliferation of 
secondary thoughts (the thought of thought), or what might 
be called the infinite supplement of supernumerary signifieds 
-a circle of which language itself is the depository and the 
model - appears as jamming: it is on the contrary the 
abolition of secondary thought which breaks the vicious 
infinity of language.(pp. 74- 75) 
I shall end this section with two more of Basho's well-known haikus: 
Shizukasa ya 
lwa ni shimiiru 
Seminokoe 
Quietness-
The cicada's cry 
Penetrates the rocks. 19 
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18 Heesoon Bai 
The story has it that Basho was visiting an ancient Buddhist temple on a 
remote mountain in autumn, and there amongst old pine and oak trees, he 
heard a cicada's cry. Was the stillness simply a matter of the remote location, 
or, besides that, was it a state of awareness attained when one is freed from, 
emptied of, "the soul's incoercible babble"? The fractious, forever fretting ego-
self, so addicted to seeing the world in terms of its own gains and losses, is 
for once unperturbed: "Quietness -."All beings of the world, finally, have the 
chance to be present to our consciousness as themselves - singular, finite, 
impermanent beings: "The cicada's cry." But this intrinsic perception of beings 
is at once a non-dual, unitary vision of Being wherein all beings emerge out 
of and merge into the infinite Being: "Penetrates the rocks." 
Here is another haiku by Basho which is cited by many for the purpose of 
elucidating the difference between what I have been calling intrinsic perception 
and instrumental perception:20 
Yoku mireba Looking closely, I see 
Nazuna hana saku A shepherd's purse blooming 
Kakine kana Under the hedge. 
Satori, the zen experience of enlightenment, is none other than just seeing 
(hearing, tasting, and so on), perception of "the myo, the as-is-ness of things, 
of their intrinsic, unhallowed sacredness" (Franck, 1993). What is required to 
see the myoof things is "[l]ooking closely," an undivided attention, freed from 
the egoic, therefore instrumentalist, desires and designs. To the enlightened 
eye, there are no insignificant weeds and "mere things". All beings in their 
"original face" are beyond measure, and therefore, beyond value. They are 
invaluable. 
Begin Here 
This essay is something of a plea. I plead that we make room in our formal 
education for the cultivation of intrinsic perception and valuation. Education 
has always been the vehicle of society's attempt at conserving what is 
perceived to be good and reforming what is not. I have argued that human 
instrumentalism is a major threat to the well-being of all beings on this planet. 
Education must once again come forward, this time, to teach us to perceive 
ltn 1nd the Art of Intrinsic Perception 19 
Mi value the world intrinsically. While all curricular subjects and activities 
lhould take on this task, it is the Arts with its foundation set in intrinsic 
IIII'Oiptlon that can take the leadership in this effort. With this recommendation, 
I do not mean, as I mentioned before, to define what Art Education is all 
about, as if Art is one simple thing. Art is as multifaceted and complex as 
human life itself; but likening it to a tree, I see that it has its deepest root, the 
tap root, in intrinsic perception. The latter takes place whenever and wherever 
one directs mindful attention to the world, so that one meets the world without 
tht preconceived notions of what to see and what to do with this seeing. 
Whtn one can pay a full, undivided attention to the other, so that one's whole 
ooneclousness is filled with the other, there is no room left for instrumental 
perception. Of course, one does not need to draw, paint, make a haiku, and 
10 on In order to experience intrinsic perception, for, one can just sit21 with an 
emptied mind and open senses, but it turns out, such "inactivity" is very difficult 
with most of us. Our minds are far too active for that, and we need an activity 
that anchors our restless mind so that it does not keep raising the dust of 
lnatrumentai perception. Artistic activities can provide such anchors. 
Currently, art education is considered marginal, a diversion and break from 
the more serious core education of such subjects as Math, Sciences, Language 
Artl, and Technology. We hear the usual pathetic description of arts being 
lfun. • As well, it is considered a specialty subject for those with special talents. 
Thll situation bespeaks amply of the marginalization of intrinsic perception 
and valuation. In protest, it has been suggested that we make Art subjects as 
Important as other core subjects, making the former more academic, which 
would then involve tests, grades, and other instrumentalist curriculum 
Mdtnologies. I am all for making Arts important and essential in our schooling 
but going the academic route will effectively decimate the already slim 
opportunity to formally promote an education in intrinsic perception. We will 
bt taking away the last tool from our own hands. It is better to stay marginalized 
for now in order to guard it from assimilation into the increasing instrumentalism 
of the mainstream education. Simultaneously, we should direct our effort, in 
our fight against instrumentalism, at anchoring arts education in a firmer 
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foundation of intrinsic perception. Without restricting or removing the 
traditionally sanctioned purposes and uses of art education, let us insist on 
reinstating intrinsic perception as its foundation. 
I remain hopeful in my vision for art education, for I see that many teachers, 
and not just art teachers, respond eagerly to this vision, recognizing in current 
educational practices the damaging ways of instrumentalism. Art education 
can be both the oasis for these weary and wary teachers and their students 
and the rallying ground for a major educational renewal.22 I dedicate this 
essay to these teachers and students 
Notes 
1 The philosophical argument that economism behind the global market is a value 
system is vigorously mounted in John McMurtry's work (1998). 
2 Charles Taylor (1991) has diagnosed instrumentalism as one of the three 
malaises, besides individualism and loss of political will, that besiege the present 
culture of what he calls atomistic individualism. Another comprehensive work that 
addresses instrumentalism and its basis in modern individualism and concomittant 
consumerism is Albert Borgmann's work, Crossing the Postmodem Divide (1992). 
3 Since this essay focuses on values and the practice of zen, it has to leave out the 
kind of details that demonstrate that indeed we live in an age of unprecedented 
environmental and societal disintegration and destruction. I will mention just one 
detail, though, because it is to me most indicative of the scale and speed of 
planetary devastation. It has been estimated that in the past the natural rate of 
species extinction was 1 to 10 species per year. But in this century, the rate has 
accelerated to at least 1,000 species per year. Biodiversity, which is the backbone of 
earth evolution, is radically undermined through the abuse and destruction of the 
planet. There is no lack of books and reports that detail the destruction of both the 
biotic and social communities. Here I shall refer the interested reader to just two 
comprehensive sources: State ofthe world by Brown et al. (2000) and Paul 
Harrison's edited volume (1996), Cating for the future: Making the next decades 
provide a life worth living (Report of the Independent Commission on Population and 
Quality of Life). 
4 From the outset, I must note the philosophical tension surrounding the notion of 
'value'. As Edward Andrew (1995) and others have noted, value as a moral concept 
has been imported into moral philosophy from economics just as when economics 
as a field of study came to separate itself from philosophy in the 17th Century. 
Before then, economics was pursued as part of moral philosophy. This explains the 
curious meaning of that when something is very valuable, we say it is invaluable: 
that is, we cannot put a value (read: a price) on it. The term 'intrinsic valuation' 
whose meaning I wish to address in this paper is then something of an oxymoron: 
that which has an intrinsic value is outside valuation. With this caution noted, I will, 
for the sake of respecting the convention of language, continue to use the term 
"intrinsic value". 
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lin ontology, there is a more technical way of explaining 'object'. Grossmann (1992, J .... of an object as "any thing which stands in the intentional nexus to a 
Mlncl!(p. 115) An object is essentially a thought-object. There cannot be an object 
Wllhout the mind that represents it. But from this, we cannot conclude (unless one is 
1 llrkellan ontologist) that no things/beings exist unless they are represented. 
Thing• and beings have their own independent existence apart from the 
flpreeentlng mind. We may call this "having independent existence" subjectness. All 
bllngs "have" this subjectness as their primary attributes; their abjectness is, I 
believe, secondary. 
I Although this essay is not a treatise on morality, I must make a brief point that this 
recognition of others' subjectness has a grave moral consequence in that the 
lbHnce of such recognition incurs much suffering in this world. One clear example 
II factory farming of animals for human meat consumption. In denying these animals 
Mn the most basic freedom of movement, we are treating them entirely as objects 
only. We have denied them subjectivity; concurrently, we are refusing to recognize 
their suffering. Only when we recognize others' subjectness, then we are capable of 
nrtous gratitude and care towards those whose life we take away to support 
ourselves. Snyder (1990) calls the economy based on such recognition 'sacramental 
economy' as opposed to our prevailing monetary economy. 
7 The reader will find an extended discussion on the nature of intrinsic versus 
Instrumental values in this book. Another valuable source on this topic is Chapter 6 
of Warren Fox's book (1990), Toward a transpersonal ecology. 
I According to figures from the 1995 State of World Children's Report (United 
Nations), 250 million dollars were spent for advertising whereas merely 13 billion 
were needed to provide everyone with primary education. Kanner and Gomes (1995, 
) eummarize that "[c]orporate advertising is likely the largest single psychological 
project ever undertaken by the human race ... "(p. 80) 
8 The question of justifiability and responsibility is most pressing. Are we ever 
Justified in looking at another being with an instrumental intent if we are truly 
oommitted to intrinsic valuing? One answer could be that as long as there is 
oonsent between beings regarding treating the other instrumentally, this is justified. 
But such consent is difficult to obtain, if not impossible in most cases, such as 
between human beings and other sentient beings they consume. Without the mutual 
consent, then, we become indebted to other beings that we treat instrumentally. 
What kind of responsibility must we assume towards them in recompense for our 
Indebtedness? 
10 Kant (1948) states: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always 
at the same time as an end"(p. 96). 
11 I want to briefly point out that the notion of fundamental, basic rights, such as the 
rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are akin to the notion of 
Intrinsic valuing that we are discussing here. Observation of human rights is about 
reepecting people not for their instrumental values contingent upon their various 
abilities, attributes, and qualities that mark the individual differences but for their 
Intrinsic worth regardless of these differences. 
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12 A prevalent philosophical dogma still exists in the West that there is no such thing 
as conceptually unmediated perception. While we must acknowledge that most of 
our perceptions are indeed mediated, and that also we should speak of degrees of 
mediation, it is empirically untenable to hold the view that all perceptions come 
already fully mediated. See The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human 
experience, by Francisco Varela, et. al (1991). 
13 Any substantial discussion on this topic lies outside the scope of the present 
essay. I refer the interested reader to the philosophical works by Loy (1988). 
14 hyamikakarikas XXV: 24. Quoted in Loy (1996, p. 92). 
15 Of course, Enlightenment cannot be "pursued," and the approach of pursuing will 
guarantee a failure, for, Enlightenment arises only when our grasping, pursuing 
mode is abandoned. 
16 Zen Buddhism itself is a good example of the essence of Buddha's teaching 
(Dharma) taking a creative hybrid form in the host Japanese culture steeped in 
Shintoism. (Chan Buddhism, a source of Japanese Zen Buddhism, is also 
something of a cultural hybrid between Indian Buddhism and Taoism.) The same 
creative adaptations are happening to American Buddhism. 
17 On an empirical ground, I dispute this claim. While we may accept that, indeed, 
much of our perception ends up being mediated, it is empirically untrue that there 
are no perceptions that are conceptually and linguistically unmediated. My claim is 
empirically verifiable by self-observation (How else can we verify this claim, 
anyway?), but the catch is that such observation takes a degree of refinement in 
attention. Incidentally, the Buddhist insight meditation ( vipassanlij prescribes a 
specific training for this refinement of attention. 
18 A common misconception exists that all meditation is a way to expand one's 
consciousness. Not for the Buddhist meditation whose requirement is a clear and 
penetrating awareness. In order to gain this, consciousness has to be focused and 
distilled, not dispersed and wandering, as in day-dreaming. 
19 Quoted from Makoto Ueda (1995, p. 157). 
20 One poem most frequently quoted as a contrast to Basho's Nazuna haiku is 
Tennyson's "Flower in the Crannied Wall" in which the poet plucks out the flower, 
root and all, in order to study it and come to understand God and Man. D. T. Suzuki 
(1959) comments: "What we can say generally about Western poetry on nature is 
that it is dualistic and personal, inquisitive and analytic"(p. 265). 
211n fact, zen meditation is often called just-sitting. To speak in irony, the "goal" of 
zen meditation is to arrive at nowhere, to gain nothing, but to just be in the moment 
with a perfect sense of joy and equanimity that come when the agitations of the mind 
subside. In the words of Loy (1996, p. 122): "The joy of just this!- the Buddhist 
experience of tathata, thusness- needs nothing, desires nothing, and thus reveals 
that the causal chain is a succession of just this! in an eternal now, where there is 
nothing to gain or lose." 
22 I would like to make a grateful acknowledgment to Linda Klassen whose masters 
dissertation is an inspiration to me, and later students, engaged with a similar vision 
of art education as a recovery from instrumentalism. See Linda Klassen's 
dissertation (2000). 
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From Gossip to Narrative Inquiry: 
Valuing Women's Stories 
Miriam Cooley 
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Abstract 
paper addresses the potential of narrative inquiry, considered within 
framework of feminist theory, to enrich our understanding of women's 
learning experiences in post secondary art education. I explore the 
motivations, processes, and practices of the translation of intimate interview 
oonversatlons into narratives that reveal the dynamics and contexts of learning 
lnd the power relation issues of narrative research practice. 
Resume 
ll'tfcle traite de Ia capacite de Ia recherche descriptive, envisage dans le 
de Ia theorie feministe, a enrichir notre comprehension des experiences 
par les femmes dans le domaine de l'enseignement superieur. II 
111 motivations, les precedes et les pratiques qui se cachent derriere 
*-iuctlon de conversations intimas en descriptions qui revelent Ia 
Mmlque et le contexte d'apprentissage et les questions de rapport de 
de Ia recherche descriptive. 
IIYtd experience are the raw materials of narrative inquiry, a research 
IIOIOgy Increasingly valued as one means through which we can better 
our ltudents' processes of learning. To recognize the narrative 
If thl experience of learning is to recognize the complex, intimate, 
rtlltld nature of what it is for human beings to learn. My narrative1 
Into women art students' life narratives and stories of formal art 
IJIPirltnOII confirmed that tacit, privately communicated knowledge 
